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Abstract1
The EU’s founding fathers had the protection of the EU’s constituent units as a key concern and 
set up serious hurdles to policy innovation in the absence of unanimous governmental 
agreement. These institutional design features, aptly characterised as “joint-decision trap” by 
Fritz W. Scharpf, were only softened but not erased over time. Nonetheless, the problem of how 
to innovate has, at times, been overcome through eclectic means. There are indeed some well 
known and quite visible practices as well as some less expected and more obscure strategies that 
have propelled the EU’s policy system beyond what has for a long time been expected.  
 
This paper argues that there are two strategic moves the European Commission (and, at times, 
other supranational actors such as the European Court of Justice) can use to actively overcome 
member state opposition:  first, sidelining some or even all national governments; and, second, 
manipulating relevant policy preferences. These two basic strategies can be seen to interconnect 
the diverging basic assumptions of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism as ‘passerelles’. 
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1 Important note regarding citation: A revised version of this text is forthcoming in: “Constructing a policy-
making state? Policy dynamics in the European Union”, edited by Jeremy J. Richardson, to be published by 
Oxford University Press in early 2012; Please cite the final version as soon as available. 
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1. INTRODUCTION2
This paper discusses the mechanisms at the EU’s disposal for bringing about policy 
innovation even in the case of governmental resistance. Empirical material from various fields 
is used to illustrate this. 
 
The topic is highly relevant because new policy initiatives are frequently met with opposition 
and stand little chance to be adopted given that the EU is a political system with particularly 
great barriers to innovation. Even the introduction of legislative action via the co-decision 
procedure has not changed the status quo in principle; the recent or future systems of 
qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers are, at least at the policy-setting level, still 
types of supermajority procedures hardly practiced in national level systems (e.g. Selck 2009). 
The protection of its constituent units, and consequently of national autonomy, has been a 
key concern of the founding fathers. As will be discussed here, the problem has been 
overcome through eclectic means. There are indeed some pre-pondered and easily visible 
practices (the Commission acts as a broker between the Council delegations, which facilitates 
learning and striking deals3
After discussing the theoretical background of clashing ideal-typical schools of integration 
theory, I will argue that there are two basic strategic moves the European Commission (and, at 
times, other supranational actors such as the European Court of Justice) can use to actively 
overcome governmental opposition. In doing so, this article offers a discussion of empirical 
phenomena that can interconnect the diverging basic assumptions of intergovernmentalism 
and neofunctionalism. They both turn a blind eye to some aspects of the EU’s practical 
workings  –  which can be useful as a strategy in as far as it allows to more easily derive 
generalised assumptions, but it must not be left out of sight as it obscures important aspects of 
European integration which can actually turn the tables in policy-making processes and hence 
), as well as some less expected and harder to reveal strategies that 
have propelled the EU’s policy system beyond what stood to be expected. The latter will be the 
focus here.  
                                            
2 Many thanks to Zdenek Kudrna for insightful comments. 
3 In this paper I will not discuss the ‚normal’ influence of the European Commission in the EU’s policy process, 
the impact it has e.g. via presenting policy proposals and via being a broker between Council delegations 
applying various traditional bargaining techniques. Log rolling, package dealing and the like have been analysed 
in-depth under the perspective of bargaining theory, and they are all in fact easily covered by a strictly 
intergovernmental perspective. Working Paper No: 03/2011    Page 5 of 25 
impact the EU’s integration output. The linking perspective between the opposing camps4 
discussed here stresses the importance of institutional dynamics and mechanisms in the EU’s 
policy process, on the level of individual decisions. In a sense, what follows is a specific, 
micro-level linking of the two opposing macro-level ‘grand theories’ of European integration.5 
In doing so, I build on the work of great colleagues, summarising the state-of-the-art on the 
basis of a fresh categorisation, aimed to facilitate systematic thinking about the sources of EU 
policy dynamism – as limited as the latter may seem, in overall terms. I would like to mention 
that although my attention here is on explaining how innovation can be brought about, this 
should not be read to mean that the EU’s potentials for policy reform are actually satisfactory 
(please see the relevant debate about problem-solving gaps in Falkner 2011c).6
The remainder of this analysis will anchor my perspective in the classic theoretical literature 
(section B) and outline two major pathways or ‘passerelles’ that can connect the approaches. 
More specifically, I argue that two basic strategies can explain the supranational institutions’ 
great impact on at least some cases of EU policy-making: sidelining some or even all 
governments (section C.) and manipulation of relevant policy preferences (section D.) The 
text will end with an outlook (section E). 
 
   
                                            
4 It should be stressed that the specific processes discussed here are not ‘half way’ between the two approaches 
since they fit the neofunctionalist assumptions much better. I conceptualise them as ‘missing links’ between the 
opposing camps (which in fact both fell short of outlining them in detail) not for reasons of ‘equidistance’ but 
because they explain exactly how, empirically, the EU can despite many intergovernmental characteristics end up 
with policy innovation against the will of governments. They hence can be seen to link the schools’ expectations, 
in empirical terms, although in theoretical terms they are closer to one of them. In fact, one could also consider 
the argument as a refinement of neofunctionalism and the two passerelles as specific mechanisms of spillover 
brought about by EU institutions. 
5  At the same time, this approach transgresses another major paradigm cleavage by including explanatory 
variables from both the rationalist and constructivist paradigms of ontology. From the perspective of problem-
oriented empirical research, there is no reason to not expect that both rational choice of interested actors and 
socialisation should play a role in European integration. 
6 In particular, the ongoing financial and economic crisis highlights that the mismatch between far-reaching 
market liberalisation, on the one hand, and often blocked political re-regulation at the EU- or global levels, on 
the other hand, might possibly even endanger the future of the integration process, as a consequence of market 
imbalances bringing banks and states to the brink of bankruptcy and confronting the European polities with 
electorates that are disappointed if not impoverished and might for this reason be even more ready to vote for 
parties far off the centre, which in turn will most probably rather endanger than support European integration. Working Paper No: 03/2011    Page 6 of 25 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In a nutshell, one can argue that the classic approaches of intergovernmentalism and 
neofunctionalism represent two opposing ends of a continuum, and that they are both overly 
scarce when it comes to opening the black boxes of actual decision-making, particularly on 
the level of the EU’s day-to-day policy-making (Peterson 1995). 
Neofunctionalism can be summarised as foreseeing  loyalties, expectations and political 
activities to shift7 towards a new political setting in a 'process whereby nations forgo the desire 
and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking 
instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making to new central organs' 
(Lindberg 1963: 103). The crucial question is how that works, and the neofunctionalists’ 
answer regarding that is the 'spillover process.' In an early and simple formulation by Haas, 
spillover refers to a situation where 'policies made in carrying out an initial task and grant of 
power can be made real only if the task itself is expanded' (Haas 1964: 111). Thus, integration 
was perceived to have the potential to move on from one decision to another, from one sector 
to another, and even from less salient matters to issues which are traditionally perceived as 
touching the core of national sovereignty and identity (Mutimer 1994: 28ff.; O'Neill 1996: 
44f.). Whether this was a necessary logic unfolding in an automatic way, was not central in 
Haas' two groundbreaking books.8  Believing in an automatism was nevertheless a crucial 
reproach9  against neofunctionalism10
                                            
7 In his seminal 1958 book on the Coal and Steel Community, 'The Uniting of Europe', the founding father of 
neofunctionalism, Ernst B. Haas, defined political integration as 'the process whereby political actors in several 
distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new 
centre' (Haas 1958). 
, combined with the apolitical understanding of 
8 In fact, many passages in Haas' two early books implicitly or even explicitly suggest that spill-over was not 
thought as an automatism in the narrow sense of this word (Haas 1958, 1964), and some contemporary authors 
stress as a characteristic for neofunctionalist thought that 'integration is not necessarily a progressive, linear 
process' (Mutimer 1994: 41; C. Rhodesand Mazey 1995: 8). 
9 In addition to the failure to specify the causal relationships between economic and political integration and 
between social values and political behaviour (Lewis 1995: 13; O'Neill 1996: 43). Among the other reasons for the 
decline of neofunctionalism as the leading integration theory seems to have been the high quantity of 
‘neofunctionalist’ writing in combination with the significant internal discrepancies within this school: '(I)t 
should be noted that neofunctionalism has come to mean different things to different people. This stems from 
neofunctionalists increasingly ad hoc reformulations, internal disagreements, and very selective and narrow 
interpretations by their successors' (Lewis 1995: 8). 
10 'In early neofunctionalist writings it was asserted that task expansion and spill-over would be automatic' 
(Groom 1994: 117; Moravcsik 1993: 476f.). Stanley Hoffmann (1966) went as far as completely dismissing the 
neofunctionalist notion of spill-over as an unproved deduction and a misleading metaphysic, an act of faith 
(O'Neill 1996: 61). Working Paper No: 03/2011    Page 7 of 25 
politics.11 Indeed, a profound shortcoming of classic neofunctionalism was that it provided 
neither a theory of bargaining nor a theory of political choice.12
Exactly the latter two focuses (bargaining and preference formation) are at the centre of 
intergovernmentalist thinking which succeeded neofunctionalism as the dominant school of 
integration theory in the 1970s. Now the governments, as the players on the EU’s Council of 
Ministers, are the focus of academic attention, they are indeed regarded as the only crucial 
actors in EU decision-making. The later, ‘neo-liberal’ variant to this theory adds a layer of 
assumptions regarding the sources of domestic preference formation preceding the EU-level 
negotiations
 
13, but it does not enrich the somewhat ‘anorexic’ ideal-type picture of the EU as a 
polity in day-to-day decision-making. Delegation of powers to the European Commission or 
the Court of Justice will, in this light, not significantly undermine state sovereignty 
(Moravcsik 1993: 513f.)  and it was not considered a relevant factor in Fritz Scharpf’s 
intergovernmental model of the joint-decision trap, either (Scharpf 1988; but compare 
Scharpf 2011). The common reproach against this school of thinking is that it lacks a deeper 
understanding of the important role of EU-level processes and institutions beyond the 
Council14
One should not be overly critical of either neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism as long 
as they understand themselves as opposing ends of an ideal-typical continuum. In fact, they 
focus – at least, in their basic variants – on different aspects, as well as driving (or blocking) 
forces, of the phenomenon of European integration, as so aptly expressed in Puchala’s picture 
of the blind men touching an elephant (Puchala 1972). Table 1 highlights the basic differences 
between the two approaches discussed, in an admittedly very crude summary that, for 
, and therefore the governments’ power is overrated, at least for day-to-day politics 
of the EU which in turn tends to be underrated vis-à-vis the grand bargains (Peterson 1995). 
                                            
11 'There is an end to ideology: politics is about giving people what they want, which is crudely interpreted as an 
increase in goods and services, and the means to achieve this is further integration. Consensus on values is 
assumed, and so high politics or power politics which deals with dissensus is not relevant.' (Groom 1994: 116) 
12 Caporaso and Keeler stress that neofunctionalism paid much attention to EC decision-making, '(b)ut this 
attention was almost completely of a descriptive nature with the "presence or absence of political will" often 
invoked to "account for" the outcomes.' (Caporaso and Keeler 1995: 36) 
13  Andrew Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism consists of two components: 'a liberal theory of how 
economic interdependence influences national interests, and an intergovernmentalist theory of international 
negotiation' (Moravcsik 1993: 474). 
14 'Whether it is the old or the new form, whether sophisticated mathematical calculations are present or absent, 
the problem with intergovernmentalism is not cosmetic but congenital. National governments are not the only 
important decision makers in the EU. The Commission of the European Communities and the European 
Parliament also play important legislative roles. It is only by analyzing the effects of institutional rules on the 
interactions among these institutions that one can understand the policies that are produced every day in the EU 
and hence the nature of the integration process itself.' (Garrett and Tsebelis 1996: 294) Working Paper No: 03/2011    Page 8 of 25 
purposes of parsimony, neglects many scholarly efforts to fine-tune each of the ‘schools’, 
particularly in recent years.15
 
  
Table 1: Focuses of the major theories of European integration 
 
APPROACH  CENTRAL ACTORS  LEVEL OF FOCUS 
Neofunctionalism 
political elites, interest 
groups; 
in recent revivals also: 
EU Commission, 








While clashes between intergovernmentalists and neofunctionalists were commonplace in 
earlier phases of European studies, the more recent past already saw an increased pragmatism. 
It constitutes, without a doubt, a progress towards moving beyond painting either 
'governments matter' or 'supranational institutions and pressure groups matter' in black and 
white. It has been stressed that 'our explanatory goals are best served by specifying the 
analytical strengths – and limitations – of approaches that work better in combination than 
alone' (Sandholtz 1993: 39), and that '(d)ifferent kinds of theory will be suitable for different 
aspects of the EU' (Sandholtz 1996: 405). We thus witnessed an increasingly peaceful co-
existence of different analytical focuses in integration theory. 
But, the other side of this coin is that ‘anything goes’ is hardly helpful when it comes to 
theorising. It may prove more fruitful to work towards an analytical integration of the various 
frameworks, forming practical tools from differing theories.  
One step in this direction is this paper’s discussion of the two major strategies16
                                            
15 Outstanding examples, in the direction of neofunctionalism, are (Niemann 2006; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 
1998; Stone Sweet 2010a). 
 that can be 
used to overcome the situations of governmental predominance that will often lead to the 
16 More specific ‘mechanisms’ were developed in a recent research project that followed the concept of the ‘joint-
decision trap’ through a large number of EU policies (Falkner 2011a). Whereas all discussions in the book just 
mentioned reflect the particular lens of the joint-decision trap and comparable fallacies of EU decision-making 
under various decision modes apart from the classic community method, this paper builds on the analytical tools 
developed in that context and re-aggregates them in a more parsimonious manner, to shed fresh light on the 
level of the ‘grand debate’ between the two major camps of European integration theory. Many empirical Working Paper No: 03/2011    Page 9 of 25 
stalemate expected by some intergovernmentalist perspectives (e.g., Scharpf’s joint-decision 
trap), helping to bring about spillover as expected by neofunctionalists – which, however, we 
acknowledge does arrive neither automatically nor regularly.17 Drawing on empirical studies 
in the field of European integration, a number of mechanisms can be identified, and two 
major ‘passerelles’
Table 2: Levels of theory in the field of European integration  
 can be grouped on this basis to connect the opposing camps of integration 
theory. These bridges can be used to explain in a parsimonious manner why there is more 
policy dynamism than would have been expected by strictly intergovernmental approaches. 
Table 2 presents these passerelles in the lowest right-hand cell, putting them in the context of 




SCOPE of explanation  CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS 
Macro  European integration 
process, overall 
Spillover processes drive integration 
(neofunctionalism); governments are 
the decisive actors 
(intergovernmentalism) 
Meso  Mid-range phenomena in 
European integration 
There are different dynamics driving 




 (Peterson 1995) 
Individual processes of EU 
decision-making 
Mechanisms to override governments 




), falling in the 
two major strategies outlined below 
(sidelining governments and 
manipulating preferences) 
It goes without saying that the overall effects of the individual micro-level processes will have 
an impact in terms of the overall European integration process and that, therefore, what is 
discussed in this paper is by no means irrelevant also viewed from a macro level. However, the 
overall aggregate effect is less than clear and certainly more ambiguous than expected by 
either camp of ‘grand’ integration theory – it needs much further research (see section E., 
below). 
                                                                                                                                     
examples used here are assembled from the scattered pre-existing literature, but where I know of no equally 
illustrative or trustworthy case studies elsewhere I will refer to empirical examples from the above-mentioned 
book. 
17 I have accordingly, a similar ambition as Adrienne Héritier in her prominent 1999 book ‘Policy-Making and 
Diversity in Europe’, which however used different categorisations and focused on slightly different aspects, most 
importantly the at times covert (as opposed to overt) quality of EU strategies that may work as ‘subterfuge’ 
(Héritier 1999). Much more complex than mine is also Niemann’s approach (Niemann 2006). 
18 See also (Christiansen et al. 1999; Falkner 2002). 
19 See in more detail below (M. Rhodes 1995). Working Paper No: 03/2011    Page 10 of 25 
The ensuing two sections will explain the two pathways and will also include brief empirical 
examples to convince the reader that these passerelles are indeed a working practice of 
European integration.   Working Paper No: 03/2011    Page 11 of 25 
3. PASSERELLE I: SIDELINING GOVERNMENTS 
Although one classic assumption is that the Council has primacy in EU policy-making, it can 
be demonstrated that the governments represented in the EU’s Council of Ministers can be 
bypassed altogether in supranational-hierarchical actions (below a) and that, alternatively, 
veto players on the Council can be sidelined in creative day-to-day politics (b). 
a) There is little controversy over the fact that the ECJ case law can go beyond the 
intergovernmental consensus and reach realms never even pre-meditated by the 
representatives of the member states. One of the clearest examples is the development of the 
doctrines of the supremacy of EU law over national law and of the potential direct effect of EU 
law in the member states, which were incrementally accepted in the jurisprudence of national 
courts (Alter 1998, 2009; Stone Sweet 2000, 2004, 2010b). 
Apart from these developments on the doctrinal meta-level of the EU’s legal system, ‘judicial 
policy-making’ is also ongoing on the level of simple policies, on an almost daily basis.20 
Because the ECJ’s powers21
Two policy examples should highlight the important role of the ECJ in the shaping of specific 
EU policies that were entirely unwanted in the Council of Ministers: social security, and tax 
policy. 
  have in recent times been applied to policy areas with high 
political salience in member states, it has been argued that the Court’s ‘dictatorial power’ 
(Scharpf 2006: 860) may even threaten the legitimacy of the European multi-level system 
(Joergesand Rödl 2008; Scharpf 2009). If ECJ judgments are directly based on a Treaty 
provision (instead of an EU-made provision adopted on the basis of this ‘primary law’), they 
can  only be reversed by unanimous agreement by the governments in either an 
intergovernmental conference or, at the very least, in the European Council, which would be 
followed by the member states’ approval. This is a very demanding process even now that the 
Treaty of Lisbon has come into force. But even if a specific ECJ decision is only based on 
‘normal’ EU law (e.g., a Directive or a Regulation), it is indeed very hard to countersteer 
through political action.  
                                            
20 It should be mentioned that the ECJ’s ‘power’ is limited in the sense that it can only take effect when cases 
come before it. That is typically triggered by the EU Commission in Treaty infringement cases or by domestic 
courts in the preliminary reference procedure where the ECJ does not rule for the case as such but over the 
interpretation of EU law used within the national proceeding. However, if they are directly and individually 
affected, enterprises and at times even individuals can refer to the ECJ. Hence, the gate towards judicial policy-
making cannot be kept under control by the governments. 
21  Nota bene, it is an important task to guarantee the rule-of-law and a coherent interpretation of any 
constituency’s rules. This essay discusses effects in terms of integration theory and this is not meant as a criticism 
of the ECJ. Working Paper No: 03/2011    Page 12 of 25 
In the field of social affairs, it has been shown, at least for one specific but important issue, 
that undoing the effects of ECJ jurisprudence was, in practice, impossible for the 
governments. The case is from an area very dear to national sovereignty; social assistance. As 
opposed to insurance-based social security, which was seen to be closely related to the 
international mobility of the labour force and to the EU’s common market, social assistance 
had been a deliberate exemption in the relevant EC Regulation 1408 from the year 1971 (see 
already Martinsen 2005). Until the Lisbon Treaty, these matters were protected by unanimity 
requirements and it could not have been made more obvious that the governments wanted 
social assistance and the exportability of such benefits to be off limits for EU discretion. 
However, judge-made policies meanwhile also cover accessibility and, to some extent, 
exportability of social minimum benefits. Although the member states at one point stood 
united and adopted a regulation undoing part of the ECJ’s impact, they would have needed a 
Treaty reform to undo all of it. Over time, further judgements undid the governments’ 
countersteering and in the end, they lost against the powerful tandem of the ECJ and 
Commission. Martinsen shows in detail how the ECJ acted as a policy setter against all 
member state governments’ wills, using primary law so that even the governments’ united 
political action in the Council could not undo the outcome.22
Viewed from a distance, the overall importance of the ECJ seems to be even larger in the area 
of EU tax policy. This is because in the absence of political agreement, judge-made rules 
largely dominate one of its major subfields. Philipp Genschel has recently argued for EU tax 
policy that, under the condition that a matter can be linked up to the EU’s internal market, it 
may indeed be that judicial policy-making is most effective exactly where the governments 
wanted to protect their sovereignty most fiercely – in the fields with long lasting unanimity 
requirements  for Council decisions (Genschel 2011). These have in practice led to the 
blockage of most policy projects regarding direct taxation in the EU. As a consequence, when 
the ECJ was asked to judge potential market distortions based on national tax rules, it 
interpreted general provisions of EU primary law to fill the gap of absent EU policy in a given 
field. In the field of direct taxation, case law fills in for absent Council legislation against the 
will of the governments. Although the member states had planned high barriers to losing 
autonomy, they ended up with much more EU influence on their systems of direct taxation 
and less sovereignty than they had expected. Even compared to the US, Genschel (ibid.) holds 
that the EU is more deeply involved in lower-level taxation policy issues, although the ECJ’s 
 In such cases, where a Treaty 
reform with national-level acceptance would be needed, the governments are entangled in a 
‘Court-decision trap’ (Falkner 2011b).  
                                            
22 The ‘non-political powers of European integration’ representing the voice of the law seem in such cases to hold 
‘the upper-hand of time’ (Martinsen and Falkner 2011: 22). Working Paper No: 03/2011    Page 13 of 25 
impact goes only in the direction of bringing down existing national rules in ‘negative 
integration’ style while it cannot itself construct a positive EU-level system.  
b) At times, it is not the Council as an institution that is sidelined in EU policy-making, but 
individual Council delegations that might otherwise block decision-taking. This is the realm 
of the so-called Treaty-base game. Originally, this expression was coined by Martin Rhodes, 
and his example of Article 118a EC-Treaty after the Single European Act’s 1987 reforms to the 
original social chapter of the EEC-Treaty is still the most telling illustration of this concept 
(M. Rhodes 1995). It is important to recall that despite the member states’ commitment to a 
Single Market Programme, the Europeanisation of social policy remained controversial even 
during the 1980s. The disagreement over how much social regulation was needed to balance 
the common market was extremely intense. In various other so-called 'flanking' (supporting) 
policy areas, notably environmental and research policy, Community competence was 
formally extended, but this was not so for social policy. In particular, the British delegation 
was unwilling to give the Community a broader role in this field. Only one important 
exception was made, and it provided an escape route out of the unanimity  requirement 
because reluctant member states could for the first time be forced to align their social 
legislation with the majority of member states, even against their will.  
Article 118a EC-Treaty allowed directives containing minimum regulatory standards 
concerning health and safety of workers to be agreed upon on the basis of a qualified majority 
in the Council. Agreement on this Article was only possible because occupational health and 
safety issues were perceived to fall within the realms of the single market and to be a rather 
‘technical’ matter. It was not expected that this provision would trigger a significant boost of 
social EU regulation during the decade to follow. The truly extensive use of this provision was 
made possible by its vague wording and the absence of a definition to its key terms: “Member 
States shall pay particular attention to encouraging improvements, especially in the working 
environment, as regards the health and safety of workers, and shall set as their objective the 
harmonization of conditions in this area, while maintaining the improvements made. In order 
to help achieve the objective laid down in the first paragraph, the Council, acting by a 
qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, ... shall adopt, by means of directives, 
minimum requirements for gradual implementation.” This wording allowed the governments 
to adopt not only measures improving the working environment (for example, a directive on 
the maximum concentration of airborne pollutants), but also measures which ensured the 
health and safety of workers by improving working conditions in a much more general sense 
(for example, limiting working time).  
Playing a Treaty-base game, the EU Commission and the majority of the member state 
governments chose Article 118a rather frequently as the legal basis for social Directives that Working Paper No: 03/2011    Page 14 of 25 
would otherwise have required unanimous decision-making on the Council (Falkner 1998: 69, 
see Table 2.1 there). In later times, the Treaty-base game was also played in another policy 
area, e.g. in the EU’s environmental policy (Holzinger 2011). What is even more interesting, 
the game has spread beyond the limits of the so-called Community method. In the realm of 
Justice and Home Affairs, the EU for many years had rather differential legal bases and 
quorums for various measures, termed the ‘first’ and ‘third’ pillars of the Treaties, respectively. 
Over time, ever more issue areas were actually processed under the Community method. The 
development happened both formally, in successive Treaty reforms, and informally in a 
Treaty-base game that for strategic reasons moved decisions in an incremental manner from 
the intergovernmental pillar to the realm of joint-decision making under the EU’s first pillar 
(Trauner 2011). 
In short, European integration has developed means to sideline both the Council as such or 
some Council delegations in order to boost the dynamics of the policy-process. This 
development was certainly not expected by the intergovernmental camp of integration theory. 
It had not been analysed by the classic writers of original neo-functionalism in detail either. 
However, these are mechanisms that allow us to understand how ‘spillover’ processes may 
happen in the absence of full political agreement – or, to use the words of Haas, when the 
political leaders themselves have not (yet) shifted their loyalties to a sufficient extent to bring 
about the same results in a political decision. 
The subsequent section will explain that another equally unexpected but less discussed pattern 
with similar effects exists. 
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4. PASSERELLE II: MANIPULATING POLICY PREFERENCES 
Not only can the Council be bypassed, entirely or in part, it is also a characteristic of the EU’s 
integration process that the governmental policy preferences, as expressed in the Council of 
Ministers, can be manipulated. 
As opposed to the expectations of rational-choice frameworks typically used in classic 
versions of intergovernmentalism, the preferences negotiated amongst the EU’s national 
delegations are not always pre-determined and/or immutable. Two arguments matter here. 
First, the orientations of political actors are ‘shaped not only by “objective” reality but also by 
“socially constructed” beliefs and institutionalised “norms of appropriateness”’ (Scharpf 2011: 
16). The EU nowadays represents one relevant environment in which such norms are 
developed and at times negotiated. Despite the great difficulties of actually proving that 
socialisation takes place on the EU-level (see Beyers 2010 for an interesting state-of-the-art 
report with many references), some convincing case studies have been presented. One major 
example is the EU’s entrapment in liberal norms and rhetorical action when it was about to 
decide Eastern enlargement (Schimmelfennig 2001). 
Second, there needs to be a more thorough discussion over whether there is  a ‘crucial 
distinction between relatively stable actor interests and highly contingent policy preferences’ 
(Scharpf 2011: 16). The latter are what matters primarily in many day-to-day policy-making 
issues, and they can indeed become the target of EU intervention and turn out to be quite 
malleable. Scholars have argued that both the ECJ (at least to some extent) and the 
Commission are indeed purposeful actors in that respect. 
Fabio Wasserfallen’s recently published findings hint that ‘the Court can successfully promote 
distinct legislative outcomes’ (Wasserfallen 2010: abstract)  and act as a wilful actor. The 
argument is that the Court decisions impact European integration effectively when the 
Council takes up judicial considerations in policy-making, and his story suggests that at times 
the judges actually have this effect in mind and draft tailor-made verdicts. Under such 
circumstances, ‘constitutional review can promote distinct policy outcomes and shape new 
legislation that would not have been in the zone of possible agreement without judicial 
activism’ (Wasserfallen 2010: 1135). The argument seems to combine socialisation aspects 
with a power aspect. Wasserfallen argues that the leverage of reluctant member states is 
seriously impinged on when the EP and the European Commission share the Court's policy 
goals and when the governments cannot agree on a common position in the Council, but also 
that ‘the Court forced reluctant member states to overcome their resistance’ (Wasserfallen 
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Wasserfallen empirically shows the judiciary taking up the leading role in policy-making 
(Wasserfallen 2010: 1135)  with a case study on the EU’s  recent legislation on exchange 
students' social rights. Although the doctrine of social security coordination affords equal 
treatment in social issues to migrant workers, and also more recently for Europeans moving to 
another member state, there has been a deep divide over whether or not national welfare 
benefits should only be granted to economically active people (Wasserfallen 2010: 1130ff). 
During the 1970s and 1980s, those warning against ‘welfare tourism’ prevailed. During the 
1990s, however, activist interpretation of Union citizenship by the ECJ introduced exchange 
students' right to claim welfare payments in their host state, despite the clear wording in 
secondary legislation. The relevant judgement was considered revolutionary because it 
introduced exchange students’ right to claim social assistance in their state of residence, but 
Wasserfallen outlines that in fact, the relevant Grzelczyk ruling fits the assumption that the 
Court balances legal and political demands (Wasserfallen 2010: 1139), thus practicing the 
most promising strategy to ensure that judicial doctrines will eventually be incorporated into 
new legislation. Indeed, the judges are said to have considered political concerns even at the 
expense of legal coherence in order to foster the establishment of a new European right, and 
their strategy was successful.  
Regarding the European Commission
a) The ‘divide-and-conquer  strategy’ means that the Commission breaks up blocking 
coalitions in the Council via 
 (instead of the Court, as stressed by Wasserfallen), a 
similar line of arguments have already been presented a couple of years ago by Susanne K. 
Schmidt (2000). She demonstrated in a very systematic manner how the Commission can 
exert autonomous influence in the process of EU policy-making, hence clearly exceeding its 
role as an agenda setter. Schmidt differentiated two strategies: 
affecting the policy preferences of some delegations
Schmidt presents an array of empirical examples, inter alia the liberalization of airport 
services where seven countries initially opposed the Commission’s proposal (Schmidt 2000: 
. It does so, 
more specifically, by singling out a few member states to pressurise. To do that, it uses 
primarily its competition law powers, those being its ability to impede mergers or fight market 
dominating positions, or it launches infringement proceedings with the ECJ against alleged 
breaches of EU law by the member state in question. Once the affected governments have 
given in and changed their domestic regulation, they no longer have an incentive to oppose 
the relevant EU-level measures as promoted by the Commission. In contrast, they change 
their policy preferences regarding EU policy, which in the Commission’s strategic ideal case 
will tip a balance in the Council and bring about the needed majority or even unanimity. In 
short, the lever is used against national legislation in a cross-levels strategy to create a more 
favourable environment for EU legislation in the Council of Ministers. Working Paper No: 03/2011    Page 17 of 25 
47). But the Commission threatened to intervene on grounds of its powers over competition 
law and made four countries alter their domestic situation, which paved the way for adoption 
of EU standards as these governments no longer opposed EU-regulation but in fact – and as 
expected  –  became strong supporters: ‘Having had to open their own markets for other 
Community actors, they want to assure that their firms find reciprocal conditions in all other 
member states’ (Schmidt 2000: 47). 
A recent contribution in the field of EU energy policy also outlines an example of this strategy 
(Pollak and Slominski 2011: 10): When at the beginning of the liberalisation process during 
the early 1990s, a couple of member states strictly opposed any market opening of their energy 
sectors, the Commission started infringement proceedings against them to break stalemate in 
the Council. It argued that existing monopolies regarding import and export of energy 
violated the EU’s internal market as provided for in the Treaties. Five states were formally 
sued and subsequently decided to pre-empt potential condemnation by the ECJ via agreeing 
to EU-regulation.23
It seems unnecessary to outline many more examples here – although, at a closer look, the 
literature would probably reveal many more –  since the mechanism is quite clear and 
convincing: levering out the domestic status quo can change a government’s (or any other 
major player’s) preferences. This does not necessarily alter the basic ‘interest’ of a member 
state, but it may certainly change the revealed policy preferences that matter in EU-level 
negotiations. 
 Additionally, the Commission is said to have ‘aggressively applied anti-
trust rules imposing significant penalties on big energy companies’ (Pollakand Slominski 
2011: 7, with further references) to make governments become supporters of its liberalisation 
agenda. It seems that the threat to investigate a merger between a French and a German 
company (EDF and EnBW) made the former open up the French electricity market and the 
latter support the Commission’s desire for an independent regulator. 
b) The second instrument available for the Commission is the ‘lesser evil’ strategy, a threat 
with a number of worst-case scenarios on the basis of judicial review (Schmidt 2000). 
Compared to the divide-and-conquer strategy, this strategy is purely at the EU-level, and it 
needs the ECJ’s support. However, if it is plausible that the judges will back the Commission’s 
line of reasoning (e.g. the liberalising interpretation of the Treaties) this strategy can be even 
                                            
23 In addition to these power-based arguments, electricity re-regulation in the EU has also served as an example 
‘that the EU institutional setting influences not only bargaining strategies but also basic policy preferences of 
member states that occupy a central position in EU decision making’ (Eising 2002: abstract), as briefly hinted at 
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more  powerful because it changes the default condition for all governments  at the same 
time.24
Schmidt’s empirical examples are, inter alia, from the field of merger regulation. The Council 
had refused earlier Commission proposals in that field. After the Cassis de Dijon judgement 
and a line of ensuing cases established the mutual recognition as the internal market’s basic 
principle, the Commission could threaten with legal action should the member states 
continue to pursue their national rules (Schmidt 2000: 53). The argument has been taken up 
prominently in the literature, combined with the expectation that the Cassis doctrine 
regarding the mutual recognition of domestic standards can be used as a threat in numerous 
fields of EU integration, and can be expected to work as a powerful lever whenever it is not an 
acceptable fallback solution in the eyes of a government. It has been stated that the mere 
threat of Court action by the Commission would ‘greatly increase the willingness of all 
governments to accept the minimum harmonization directives proposed by the Commission’ 
(Scharpf 2006: 853). 
 
In her contribution from 2000, Susanne K. Schmidt already hinted that the insecurity arising 
from ‘a poorly defined European competence they had not had any input in bringing about, 
made it desirable for the governments to delegate explicit European powers, whose conditions 
they would specify’ (Schmidt 2000: 53). In a recent manuscript, she develops a fresh argument 
that the need for legal security drives the governments in the Council to adopt policies that go 
even beyond the case law’s base line. Legal uncertainty is considered highly damaging as it 
hampers long-term private and public investment, and particularly if it brings about 
indemnity claims, there is an incentive for governments to re-establish legal certainty – a 
slippery slope towards specific policy options: ‘Once there is case law, the legislature has an 
incentive to settle on the most far-reaching interpretation of the ambiguous case law, as 
otherwise an interpretation of secondary law in the light of the case law may again fail to 
secure legal certainty. Where the Court delicately balances between national regulatory 
concerns and community interests, this may imply favouring community interests one-
sidedly.’ (Schmidt 2011: 27) Outlining two examples in detail, the Services Directive and the 
Regulation on Mutual Recognition, Schmidt argues that ‘fuzziness’ of case law may impose ‘a 
bias for secondary legislation to settle on the extreme position – and to go even beyond it.’ 
(ibid.) Overall, this seems to suggests that within the member states’ interests, their position 
on legal certainty ranks high amongst the various aspects considered under the political 
science label of ‘policy preferences’ and has to date been underrated as a lever in the shaping 
of EU policies. From a perspective of democratic legitimacy, it is highly interesting to note 
that neither the people’s representatives in the European Parliament nor the governments on 
                                            
24 However, some may be more affected than others. Working Paper No: 03/2011    Page 19 of 25 
the EU’s Council of Ministers made public how much case law actually restrained their 
options, in the two outstanding and controversial cases discussed by Schmidt. 
The goal of summarizing this insightful scholarly work was to convey that the Commission 
and the ECJ can largely temper the ‘interests’ of member states. More specifically, we can 
witness in these detailed accounts that, if the long-lasting basic convictions about overall 
national self-interest were not changed fundamentally, at least the immediate policy 
preferences were significantly affected – and consequently the options that matter directly in 
the day-to-day business of the European policy process. They decide on matters of 
breakthrough and stalemate in specific projects of EU decision-making. 
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5. OUTLOOK 
As outlined in the introductory section, we can say – at least in a black-and-white approach – 
that intergovernmentalism perceives the governments as the sole crucial decision makers in 
the process of European integration. The outcomes reflect their interests, and there is a great 
danger that non-decisions or clearly sub-optimal policies result from their bargaining in a 
situation of joint-decision trap (Scharpf 1988). By contrast, the neofunctionalists highlighted 
that spillover processes could overcome governmental stalemates although their classic 
writings tended to black box the exact process of how that could happen. At least, Philippe 
Schmitter specified that next to the underlying interdependence of functional tasks and issue 
arenas, also 'the creative talents of political elites, especially the administrators of regional 
institutions, who seize upon frustrations and crises in order to redefine and expand central 
organizational tasks' (Schmitter 1969) would be helpful. But how exactly? 
The aspects discussed in this article represent a concrete link between these two opposing 
ideal types of EU integration theory. Two basic strategies were presented25 that can potentially 
allow for an exit from intergovernmental stalemate, even against the will of all or some 
governments. This paper’s contribution to the state-of-the-art in this field is in the specific 
conceptualisation26
Do we need this kind of analysis? One could argue that we have ‘grand’ theorising such as that 
of the opposing schools discussed here in the initial section; we have empirical case studies; 
and we have negotiation theory
 with only two parsimonious ‘passerelles’ (sidelining of all or some Council 
delegations, and re-forming policy preferences). Indeed, a line of research can now be said to 
have matured both qualitatively (regarding the refinement of the various arguments) and 
quantitatively (regarding the number of examples available in the, hitherto scattered, 
literature) so that the arguments could here be presented more parsimoniously and well-
documented than before.  
27
                                            
25 However, what is discussed here is not on the level of each individual mechanism that can possibly be found in 
day-to-day policy-making, as the author has done elsewhere (Falkner 2011a). The mechanisms are now 
aggregated in only two major strategies (passerelles) for an easier grasp of the argument. 
  –  EU integration scholars do not suffer from a lack of 
commendable literature. However, the author would counter that the arguments of the highly 
elaborated versions of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism of the last two decades are 
not easily  comprehensible and that the clear-cut differences of earlier decades were 
increasingly blurred (which is why the author opted for an extremely simplified 
representation of them for our purposes here). In any case, there is still a gap in the 
scholarship at the crossroads of different approaches. It seems a worthy topic to help reveal 
26 Specifying categories is an acknowledged step of theory formation (Mayntz 2002). 
27 My approach is actually more fine-grained – more micro-level – than negotiation theory (see the recent JEPP 
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what actually can be done to combine the thinking of one with the other. After all, they are 
simply opposing ideal-typical descriptions of the EU’s workings and so  there must be 
connecting mechanisms in the day-to-day workings of this institutional setting. 
At the same time, the limitations of this paper’s approach are clear. To date, we avail only of a 
limited number of case studies on the workings of these mechanisms and cannot (yet) offer a 
causal theory about when these strategies will be able to overpower one or several 
governments. A model of the relative importance is also generally difficult to offer. Detailed 
knowledge is needed to judge if and how an ECJ verdict or a Commission threat or action can 
actually impact governmental stances; we therefore cannot realistically hope to quickly and 
economically answer the question of how important these processes are, in overall terms. It 
would be worthwhile, however, to progress  in the direction of this major research 
desideratum.  
In any case, one argument is clear: The overall importance of the mechanisms outlined here is 
in all probability very great, as the ECJ’s powers of constitutional review are particularly 
influential. This is because the Treaties are rather incomplete contracts (Stone Sweet 2004: 
24), to be specified by legislation or by judicial means, in the absence of such legislation or if 
the secondary law is again less than complete (Wasserfallen 2010). The famous market 
freedoms of European integration grant a remarkably great scope of application to the effects 
of judicial review, since there is ‘hardly any field of public policy for which it will not be 
possible to demonstrate a plausible connection to the guarantee of free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital’ (Scharpf 1994: 6). 
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